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The O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University is the
premier center for health law, scholarship and policy. Housed at Georgetown University Law
Center, in the heart of the nation’s capital, the Institute has the mission to provide innovative
solutions for the leading health problems in America and globally—from infectious and chronic
diseases to health care financing and health systems. The Institute, a joint project of the Law
Center and School of Nursing and Health Studies, also draws upon the University’s considerable
intellectual resources, including the School of Medicine, the Public Policy Institute, and the
Kennedy Institute of Ethics.
The essential vision for the O’Neill Institute rests upon the proposition that the law has
been, and will remain, a fundamental tool for solving critical health problems in our global,
national, and local communities. By contributing to a more powerful and deeper
understanding of the multiple ways in which law can be used to improve health, the O’Neill
Institute hopes to advance scholarship, research, and teaching that will encourage key decisionmakers in the public, private, and civil society sectors to employ the law as a positive tool for
enabling more people in the United States and throughout the world to lead healthier lives.


Teaching. Georgetown is educating future generations of students who will become – upon
their graduation – policymakers, health professionals, business leaders, scholars, attorneys,
physicians, nurses, scientists, diplomats, judges, chief executive officers, and leaders in many
other private, public, and nonprofit fields of endeavor. The O’Neill Institute helps to prepare
graduates to engage in multidisciplinary conversations about national and global health care
law and policy and to rigorously analyze the theoretical, philosophical, political, cultural,
economic, scientific, and ethical bases for understanding and addressing health problems.



Scholarship. O’Neill supports world-class research that is applied to urgent health problems,
using a complex, comprehensive, interdisciplinary, and transnational approach to go beyond
a narrow vision of health law that focuses solely on health care as an industry or as a
scientific endeavor.



Reflective Problem-Solving. For select high-priority issues, the O’Neill Institute organizes
reflective problem-solving initiatives in which the Institute seeks to bridge the gap between
key policymakers in the public, private, and civil society sectors and the intellectual talent
and knowledge that resides in academia.
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OVERVIEW
LEGAL SOLUTIONS IN HEALTH REFORM
The American public has increasingly identified health care as a key issue of concern. In order
to address the multiple problems relating to the access and affordability of health care, President
Obama and federal lawmakers across the political spectrum continue to call for major health
reform. In any debate on health reform, a predictable set of complex policy, management,
economic, and legal issues is likely to be raised. Due to the diverse interests involved, these
issues could lead to a series of high-stakes policy debates. Therefore, it is critical that
advocates of reform strategies anticipate such issues in order to decrease the likelihood that
legally resolvable questions become barriers to substantive health reform. In an effort to
frame and study legal challenges and solutions in advance of the heat of political debate, the
O’Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law at Georgetown University and the Robert
Wood Johnson Foundation have crafted the “Legal Solutions in Health Reform” project.
This project aims to identify practical, workable solutions to the kinds of legal issues that may
arise in any upcoming federal health reform debate. While other academic and research
organizations are exploring important policy, management, and economic questions relating to health
reform, the O’Neill Institute has focused solely on the critical legal issues relating to federal health
reform. The target audience includes elected officials and their staff, attorneys who work in key
executive and legislative branch agencies, private industry lawyers, academic institutions, and other
key players. This project attempts to pave the road towards improved health care for the nation
by providing stakeholders a concise analysis of the complex legal issues relating to health
reform, and a clear articulation of the range of solutions available.

LEGAL ISSUES V. POLICY ISSUES
Among the major issues in federal health reform, there are recurring questions that are policybased and those that are legally-based. Many times questions of policy and of law overlap and
cannot be considered in isolation. However, for the purpose of this project, we draw the
distinction between law and policy based on the presence of clear legal permission or
prohibition.
Under this distinction, policy issues include larger-scale questions such as what basic model of
health reform to use, as well as more technical questions such as what threshold to use for
poverty level subsidies and cost-sharing for preventive services. In contrast, legal issues are
those involving constitutional, statutory, or regulatory questions such as whether the Constitution
allows a certain congressional action or whether particular laws run parallel or conflict.
Based on this dividing line of clear permission or prohibition, policy questions can be framed as
those beginning with, “Should we…?”, and legal questions can be framed as those beginning
with, “Can we…?” The focus of this paper will be the latter, broken into three particular
categories: 1) “Under the Constitution, can we ever…?”; 2) “Under current statutes and
regulations, can we now…?”; 3) “ Under the current regulatory scheme, how do we…?” This
final set of questions tends to be mixed questions of policy, law, and good legislative drafting.

PURPOSE AND LAYOUT OF THE PROJECT
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This project is an effort to frame and study legal challenges and solutions in advance of the heat
of political debate. This effort is undertaken with the optimistic view that all legal problems
addressed are either soluble or avoidable. Rather than setting up roadblocks, this project is a
constructive activity, attempting to pave the road towards improved health care for the nation.
Consequently, it does not attempt to create consensus solutions for the identified problems nor is
it an attempt to provide a unified field theory of how to provide health insurance in America.
Furthermore, this project does not attempt to choose among the currently competing proposals or
make recommendations among them. Instead, it is a comprehensive project written to provide
policy makers, attorneys, and other key stakeholders with a concise analysis of the complex legal
issues relating to health reform and a clear articulation of the range of solutions available for
resolving those questions.

LEGAL ISSUES
Based on surveys of current health policy meetings and agendas, popular and professional press,
and current health reform proposals, our team formulated a list of legal issues relating to federal
health reform. After much research, discussion, and expert advice and review, our initial list of
over 50 legal issues was narrowed to ten. An initial framing paper was drafted which identified
these ten legal issues and briefly outlined the main components of each. In May of 2008, a
bipartisan consultation session was convened to provide concrete feedback on the choice and
framing of the legal issues. The attendees of the consultation session included congressional
staff, executive branch officials, advocates, attorneys, employers, and representatives of a wide
range of interests affected by health reform. Feedback and analysis from this session further
narrowed the ten issues to eight key legal issues which warranted in depth analysis of the current
law.
These eight pertinent issues are truly legal in nature and must be addressed in any significant
reform proposal to avoid needless debate or pitfalls as policy decisions are made. There are
multiple other legal issues that will arise as the discussion evolves and, if a federal policy is
adopted, the system changes. In this project, however, we have targeted the issues essential for
an immediate discussion of federal health reform.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Prepared by the O’Neill Institute
INTRODUCTION:
The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) is a federal law regulating the
administration of private employer-sponsored benefits including health benefits (i.e., health
insurance offered by an employer). In general, since the federal government has exercised its
authority to preempt state regulation of the administration of private employer-sponsored health
plans, states are blocked from enforcing laws interfering with ERISA.
As many states pursue health care reform experiments, ERISA preemption becomes relevant as a
potential limit on the scope and type of reforms states are able to enact. The dominant trend in
ERISA litigation has been to preempt state legislation and litigation interfering with the
administration of private employer sponsored health plans, making large-scale state health care
reform initiatives difficult. The purpose of this paper is to examine the trajectory of judicial
interpretation of ERISA and to discuss what opportunities exist to facilitate health care initiatives
given the constraints of ERISA preemption.
RELEVANT LAW – ERISA PRIMER:
ERISA’s Preemption Provisions
 ERISA’s preemption clause preempts all state laws that relate to an employee benefit plan.
 ERISA contains an exception to this preemption rule, referred to as the “savings clause,” that
allows state laws to regulate the business of insurance.
 Finally, ERISA (through the “deemer clause”) prevents states from characterizing a selfinsured plan as the business of insurance.
ERISA’s Remedial Scheme
 Plan participants may bring a civil action under ERISA against a plan administrator who fails
to comply with a request for information about the plan, to recover claimed benefits, to
enforce rights under terms of the plan, or to clarify rights for future benefits.
 A plan participant can only recover the amount of the benefits denied.
 ERISA imposes a fiduciary duty on those who make discretionary decisions on behalf of the
employee benefit plan. However, courts tend to be very deferential to fiduciaries.
LITIGATION TRENDS:
ERISA litigation takes two general forms: the first involves challenges to state regulation of
health plans and insurers, and the second involves challenges to state tort lawsuits for delay or
denial of health care. Though the former is more directly relevant to health care reform
initiatives, courts have used the same analyses in both litigation areas. While smaller-scale state
reforms may survive ERISA preemption, it is an open question as to how the Supreme Court
might rule on whether ERISA preempts state “pay-or-play” laws.
Challenges to State Regulation of Health Plans and Insurers
State Pay-or-Play Laws
 The Fourth Circuit held that Maryland’s Wal-Mart Law was preempted because it affected
only one company in the state and the law effectively forced Wal-Mart to restructure its
health benefit plan to increase coverage.
O’NEILL INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL AND GLOBAL HEALTH LAW
GEORGETOWN LAW | 600 NEW JERSEY AVENUE NW | WASHINGTON, DC 20001
www.oneillinstitute.org
1

 The Ninth Circuit held that a similar pay-or-play law enacted in San Francisco was not
preempted by ERISA because it applied to multiple types of employers. In addition, and in
part because the law applied to employers with and without ERISA plans, employers had an
actual choice to either pay into county funds or offer health benefits, unlike the Maryland
law.
 It is still an open question as to whether or not the pay-or-play provisions of the
Massachusetts Health Care Reform Act of 2006 will be preempted.
Individual Mandates
 Individual mandates have not yet been litigated under ERISA, but Courts are unlikely to find
that individual mandates bind administrators and dictate plan choices.
Smaller-scale State Health Care Regulation
 State laws of general applicability, such as a state law imposing hospital bill surcharges on
commercial insurers, are not preempted because their effect on employee benefit plans is
indirect and insubstantial.
 State laws that are directed at insurance and that substantially affect the pooling of risk
between an insurer and insured are saved, thus not preempted. Such laws include “any
willing provider” laws that prevent a health plan from excluding any health care provider
who is willing and able to meet the terms and conditions of plan participation.
Challenges to State Tort Lawsuits
 State laws that offer a remedy that supplants ERISA’s exclusive remedial structure, such as a
breach of contract action against a managed care organization for denial of coverage or a law
imposing a duty on a managed care organization to exercise ordinary care in handling
coverage decisions, have generally been found to be preempted.
POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS:
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that if ERISA preemption is to change, it is Congress’
responsibility, not the Court’s, to do so. There are several ways that the federal government can
act:
Congressional Action
 Enact ERISA waivers to permit state health reform experiments.
 Amend ERISA to explicitly allow state-based tort litigation against managed care
organizations.
Regulatory Action through Executive Authority
 The Department of Labor (DOL) could define “plan” and “benefit” in ways that expand the
relief available under ERISA’s remedial scheme in regulations.
 DOL could publish guidance on valid state options under ERISA.
 DOL could amend regulations on the fiduciary duty obligations to require plan administrators
to justify a benefit denial decision with evidence-based medicine.
CONCLUSION:
ERISA opinions are largely impenetrable, often leading to convoluted legal doctrine. Nobody
can easily predict what will be preempted. Yet, there is a certain consistency that emerges over
time—the return to preemption as the default option. Given this trend, states must tread
carefully in crafting health care reform initiatives that address the crisis of the uninsured without
impermissibly burdening private employers’ provision of employee benefit plans.
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Legal Solutions in Health Reform:
The Role of ERISA Preemption in Health Reform: Opportunities and Limits
Peter D. Jacobson, JD, MPH 1
Introduction: ERISA Preemption in the Context of Health Care Reform
It should come as no surprise to any observer of health policy debates that the preemption
provisions of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) will play a major role in
determining the contours of any health reform initiative. For the past few years, many states
have been aggressively pursuing health reform experiments, while congressional action has
essentially been deadlocked along partisan political lines. Yet after the 2008 election results,
there is reason to expect considerable congressional attention to health reform. President Obama
has made health reform a priority of his administration, and several members of Congress have
long been waiting for an opportunity to pursue health reform legislation.
At this point, it would be premature to speculate on the actual contours of legislation that might
be enacted. But initiatives under serious consideration include “pay-or-play” measures (where
employers must either provide health insurance or pay the government a defined amount per
employee), and mandating that individuals purchase health insurance (similar to mandatory
automobile insurance). Since similar initiatives have already been enacted at the state level, one
possible scenario is that Congress may coalesce around legislation that involves some type of
state-federal cooperation.
Any comprehensive state-level health reform legislation or federal legislation that relies on state
activity must take into account the states’ vulnerability to ERISA preemption. An important
aspect of the balance between federal and state authority is the concept of preemption, which
means that the federal government can preclude states from regulating a particular area. 2 The
rationale is to provide national uniformity in certain areas. When Congress legislates in an area
and reserves power to the federal government, states may not regulate. For example, the federal
government has exclusive authority for regulating nuclear power. That precludes, or preempts,
any state or local attempts to regulate this field. Because ERISA preemption potentially limits
the scope and type of reforms that the states might pursue, federal health reform proposals that
rely on state experiments without amending ERISA could be undermined. Even if no federal
legislation is enacted, ERISA preemption will remain central to the policy debate as to how far
states can proceed on their own to enact comprehensive health reform laws.
This is an ironic result in two respects. For one thing, at a time when federal policymakers are
encouraging state health reform initiatives, a complex federal law may imperil aggressive state
health coverage experiments. In the absence of federal action, ERISA preemption may block
legitimate reforms that the political system desires. For another, if state efforts are indeed
blocked, pressure is likely to mount on Congress either to amend ERISA or resolve the current
political deadlock. The unintended consequence of ERISA preemption, therefore, is that a
statute designed to facilitate the national administration of employee health and welfare benefits
is now the primary impediment to a broad range of state-based health reforms that would benefit
employers and employees alike.
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The purpose of this paper is to examine the constraints of ERISA preemption in the context of
potential health reform initiatives, and the opportunities that might exist to facilitate health care
reform initiatives given ERISA preemption. Although ERISA would not impede comprehensive
federal health reform legislation, any serious discussion of the states’ role in the process needs to
take ERISA preemption into account. The thesis of this paper is that the dominant trend in
ERISA litigation has been to preempt challenges to state legislation and liability lawsuits against
health plans. From the beginning, judicial opinions in ERISA litigation have generally favored
preemption over allowing state regulation of Employee Benefit Plans (EBPs) (e.g., private
employer sponsored health insurance), and preempted most lawsuits challenging a health plan’s
denial or delay of health care benefits. Whenever lower courts stray somewhat from preemption,
the inevitable reaction at the appellate level is to restore preemption as the default option.
To provide an overview of ERISA, the next section briefly describes the salient provisions that
might affect health reform legislation, followed by a summary of ERISA litigation trends.
Although the primary focus in this paper is the extent to which ERISA preempts state-based
insurance regulation, it is also necessary to consider patients’ state medical liability litigation
against health insurance plans (including managed care organizations) to understand the policy
context and implications. The paper then focuses on current litigation challenging state health
reform initiatives, and concludes with a discussion of potential policy solutions.
I. An ERISA Primer
Congress enacted ERISA in 1974 primarily to regulate pension plans, but also included health
benefit plans within its scope. 3 ERISA governs EBPs, including health care benefits (defined
broadly to include any medical, surgical, or hospital benefits) covering approximately 65% of the
insured population. 4 ERISA’s goals are to: establish uniform national standards; safeguard
employee benefits from loss or abuse; and encourage employers to offer those benefits. ERISA
does not mandate that employers offer benefit plans, but provides a structure for national
uniformity of administration once such plans are extended. Nevertheless, ERISA has several
provisions that directly affect state health reform initiatives: the preemption provisions, its
limited remedial scheme, and its fiduciary duty obligation.
Many observers and stakeholders credit ERISA preemption with facilitating the growth of
managed care and allowing large employers to develop national coverage arrangements for
employees. The consequences of ERISA preemption lie at the heart of past congressional
debates over whether proposed patients’ rights legislation, if enacted, would permit patients to
sue health plans for delayed or denied care, and whether the current state-based health reforms
underway or under consideration can survive an ERISA preemption challenge. Throughout this
discussion, it is important to keep in mind that ERISA presents a series of tradeoffs and careful
balancing between protecting the interests of health plan beneficiaries (i.e., employees) and
encouraging employers to adopt and fund EBPs.
A. ERISA’s Preemption Clause
Traditionally, states are responsible for regulating health care delivery, and litigation against
health care providers is resolved under state law. Medical liability lawsuits are rarely heard in
federal courts. ERISA alters the traditional approach because it preempts state law, which means
that state laws purporting to regulate health plans may not be enforced in any court. 5 In this
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context, state laws include legislation and regulations, such as those mandating particular benefit
coverage, and most medical liability actions targeting health plans. ERISA preempts state laws
that attempt to regulate EBPs (both self-funded and fully insured) and drastically limits state
medical liability lawsuits against health plans, while providing minimal federal regulation in
their place. But ERISA does not prevent a state from regulating the underlying insurance
coverage that an individual purchases in either the commercial market or as provided to an
employer group plan. Drawing the line between the two concepts has not been easy and adds to
ERISA’s general complexity. The end result is that states can mandate insurance benefit
coverage for non-ERISA plans, but not for an EBP.
From the beginning, courts have interpreted the preemption clause broadly to prevent
enforcement of state laws ranging from laws protecting the physician-patient relationship to
litigation challenging how cost containment initiatives are implemented. The courts have held
that Congress intended such broad preemption of state law to allow a multistate employer to
offer a single, nationally consistent plan to all its workers without the cost and inconvenience of
complying with contradictory state regulations, legislation, or litigation. National uniformity
conforms to congressional intent to keep the costs of administering an EBP low to encourage
employers to offer health coverage. 6
In assessing whether a particular state law is prohibited, courts look sequentially to each of the
three parts of the preemption provision. First, courts decide whether the state law “relates to” an
EBP. 7 In doing so, courts consider whether the challenged law burdens the administration of
plan benefits or has only a remote impact on them. Courts generally hold that ERISA preempts
state laws that bind employers or plan administrators to particular benefit choices or that
preclude the uniform administration of an EBP. 8 For example, a state lawsuit challenging a
benefit determination, such as a health plan’s denial of additional hospital coverage, relates to an
employer-sponsored health plan because that challenge would require the court to interpret the
plan’s benefits, hence binding the administrator to certain actions. But laws with only a remote
or incidental effect on plan administration, such as a surcharge on hospital services, may not
relate to the EBP.
A law is not preempted merely because it relates to a plan. Courts must also interpret two
qualifying provisions, ERISA’s “savings” and “deemer” clauses. The savings clause provides
that laws regulating the business of insurance, even if they relate to an EBP, will not be
preempted. Under the savings clause, states are not preempted from enacting and enforcing state
laws governing the business of insurance (i.e., state regulation of health insurance), such as
solvency or licensing requirements. In turn, the deemer clause qualifies the savings clause. The
deemer clause prevents states from deeming (or characterizing) an ERISA-covered plan as the
business of insurance. States may not characterize a self-funded plan as an insurer to circumvent
the effect of the “relates to” provision.
As an example of how these terms interact, consider a state law mandating certain health
insurance benefits. That law relates to an ERISA plan since it would involve the structure of
plan benefits. Even though the legislation would be saved from preemption insofar as it
regulates EBPs that purchase traditional insurance policies, it would still be preempted if, for
instance, a state attempted to apply the statute to a self-funded EBP. Under the deemer clause, a
self-funded EBP cannot be an insurer.
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B. ERISA’s Limited Remedies
ERISA provides some relief for injuries to health plan participants through its civil enforcement
scheme. A plan participant or beneficiary may bring a civil action against an administrator who
fails to comply with a request for information about the plan, to recover claimed benefits, to
enforce rights under the terms of the plan, or to clarify rights to future benefits. 9 A plan
participant may also bring suit against a plan fiduciary who breaches any fiduciary duties, and
may seek to enjoin practices which violate ERISA or the terms of the plan.
Even if victorious, a plan participant can usually only recover the amount of the benefits that
should have been provided, as well as certain incidentals such as attorneys’ fees. This is a
decidedly more limited remedy than usually available under state law, where the patient might be
able to recover damages for any economic losses, non-economic damages for pain and suffering,
and possibly punitive damages, especially in cases alleging bad faith insurance denial. 10
Effectively, this insulates the health plan from exposure to monetary damages, except for what it
would have paid (the amount of the denied benefit) in the first place.
C. Fiduciary Duties
ERISA imposes a fiduciary duty on those who make discretionary decisions on behalf of the
EBP. A fiduciary must discharge his or her discretionary functions "solely in the interest of the
participants and beneficiaries" of the plan. 11 In many, but not all cases, 12 courts have held that
health plans are subject to this fiduciary duty when making certain decisions, such as reviewing
the appropriateness of a physician’s treatment recommendations. 13 On the other hand, health
plans and employers are not considered fiduciaries with regard to establishing or changing the
terms of the plan. Thus, the fiduciary duty extends only to decisions made once the plan is in
place. 14 Employers must provide whatever health benefits they promise, but need not offer plans
at all and can change what they offer after giving plan beneficiaries proper notice.
Another aspect of the fiduciary duty is to preserve plan assets, meaning that the fiduciary must
balance the interests of an individual beneficiary against the interests of all plan participants. In
exercising the fiduciary duty, one obvious problem is that the clinical needs of one patient may
conflict with the health plan’s economic interests (i.e., preserving plan assets to benefit all
participants). Increasingly, disappointed plan beneficiaries have sued for breach of fiduciary
duty, often challenging the denial of physician-prescribed benefits, especially when there is a
potential conflict of interest. 15
To determine whether a health plan breached its fiduciary duty when denying plan benefits (i.e.,
that the denial is not “solely in the interest of the participant”), courts employ different levels of
scrutiny based on the amount of discretion granted to the plan under the EBP. Generally, courts
are very deferential, upholding the plan administrator as long as the plan expressly grants
discretion to the plan administrator and the decision was not arbitrary and capricious. 16 In most
cases, courts have equated compliance with the terms of the EBP as, by definition, acting in the
interests of the plan participant. As a result, the court limits its review to ensuring that the plan
administrator reasonably comported with the terms of the EBP. 17 By controlling the
interpretation of EBP terms (including medical necessity), health plans retain power vis-a-vis
physicians. But in a case where the plan profits directly from the denial, the potential conflict of
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interest must be considered as perhaps the most important factor in deciding whether there was
an abuse of the fiduciary’s discretion. 18
D. Federal Regulations
The Department of Labor (DOL) has jurisdiction over ERISA. For the most part, DOL has taken
a hands-off approach to EBPs (focusing on pensions), limiting its regulatory oversight to some
specific procedural requirements. To be sure, these procedural regulations, such as the types of
information that must be provided to plan beneficiaries and participants, how claims are handled,
and required reporting to DOL, are hardly trivial. But they are not the kinds of substantive
regulations that are equivalent to state insurance oversight and enforcement. In essence, ERISA
preemption creates a regulatory vacuum where states cannot act and there is no comparable
federal regulatory presence.
II. ERISA Litigation Trends
To understand the nature of the ERISA preemption challenges to current state-based health
reform initiatives, it is helpful to sketch the trends in ERISA litigation. Although there are
numerous branches of ERISA litigation, the two that are most important for health reform are
cases dealing with preemption of state tort lawsuits for delayed or denied health care, and those
challenging state regulation of health plans and other health insurers. The reason why we need
to look at both types of cases is that they do not operate in isolation from one another. How the
courts interpret ERISA in one line of cases influences the judicial analysis of the statute in the
other area. 19 In this sense, both aspects are interpreted simultaneously and contribute equally to
the development of legal doctrine in ERISA preemption litigation over time. Because this paper
is more concerned with health reform, the subsequent analysis will focus on those cases rather
than on the state tort litigation decisions.
As noted earlier, the dominant trend in ERISA litigation from the beginning has been to favor
preemption over more expansive interpretations that would otherwise provide states with
flexibility to oversee how employer-sponsored health plans operate. For many reasons, however,
any general statement about ERISA trends is contestable. To begin with, there is little academic
agreement on exactly what the cases really signify, 20 and little judicial consensus on how to
interpret ERISA and which lines of ERISA cases to follow. Finding coherence from the myriad
of ERISA opinions is quite difficult. At best, ERISA doctrine is neither predictable nor stable; it
is, rather, largely muddled and most opinions are impenetrable.
A. The Early Litigation: 1983-1995
Initial conditions matter, and early ERISA preemption rulings consistently favored a broad
reading of the statute, especially the “relates to” provision. With rare exception in the early
litigation, the U.S. Supreme Court broadly preempted state tort litigation and state regulations of
health insurance plans. 21 In these cases, the Court defined the “relates to” provision very
broadly to preempt virtually any law that either refers or connects to (no matter how remotely) an
administrator’s benefit determination. For example, the Court preempted a state law requiring
pregnancy related health benefits because it related to (i.e., burdened) the administration of an
EBP (prior to Congress’s enactment of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act in 1978). 22 Viewed as
a whole, the early rulings established the Court’s approach of interpreting congressional intent as
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encouraging multistate employers to offer employees a single plan that could be administered
nationally without the cost and inconvenience of complying with contradictory state regulations.
Deference to congressional intent meant broad preemption. 23 A review of the Congressional
record, however, indicates Congress’ overarching purpose of ERISA was to protect plan
participants and beneficiaries (i.e., employees). 24 And Congress’ failure to give much thought
to the implications of adding health benefits to what was primarily a pension statute resulted in
the Court having considerable latitude on interpreting the scope of preemption. While the broad
preemption rulings were not necessarily inconsistent with the legislative history, nothing in
either the language of the statute or its legislative intent required these results. 25 Part of the
interpretive difficulty was that the statute predated the emergence of managed care as the
dominant mechanism for financing and delivering health care. At any time, of course, Congress
could intervene to clarify its intent.
Despite the McCarran-Ferguson Act, which explicitly reserves insurance regulation to the states,
these early rulings divested states of regulatory authority over EBPs. As a consequence, the
Supreme Court uniformly favored broad preemption of state involvement over a narrower sphere
allowing states some room to regulate and hold health plans accountable. Because ERISA
provides no substantive terms of its own and DOL as the regulatory agency has eschewed
substantive regulation of EBPs, the oft-noted regulatory vacuum emerged.
Aside from the doctrinal consequences, the decisions themselves are basically impenetrable.
Neither lower court judges nor academics could easily understand and apply the rulings in
subsequent cases. Even Supreme Court judges admitted the muddle that their rulings created.
For instance, the committed textualist Justice Anonin Scalia subsequently concluded that
“Applying the ‘relate to’ provision according to its terms was a project doomed to failure, since,
as many a curbstone philosopher has observed, everything is related to everything else.” 26
Notwithstanding this admonition, neither the Court nor Congress reconsidered the doctrinal
pedestal of preemption.
B. Departures From Preemption: 1995-2003
State Insurance Regulations. The first departure from a stringent preemption analysis came in
1995 with the case of New York State Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Insurance Co., 27 where the Court signaled that state laws having only an indirect
economic connection to EBPs would not be preempted. In this case, New York State
imposed hospital bill surcharges on all commercial insurers other than the Blues. The Court
ruled that the surcharge was a general health regulation that had only an indirect effect on
EBPs, and did not bind plan administrators to any particular benefit choice. After Travelers,
courts have been willing to uphold state health insurance regulations against an ERISA
preemption challenge where the legislation has only an indirect effect on an EBP. In fact, as
discussed below, applying the direct-indirect analysis to current state health reform
legislation is one key in determining whether state reform initiatives will survive an ERISA
preemption challenge.
Two subsequent Supreme Court rulings on state regulation of health plans also seemed to
indicate a judicial willingness to reexamine the conceptual basis of ERISA preemption doctrine.
In the 2002 case of Rush Prudential HMO v. Moran, 28 the Court expanded a state’s ability to
O’NEILL INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL AND GLOBAL HEALTH LAW
GEORGETOWN LAW | 600 NEW JERSEY AVENUE NW | WASHINGTON, DC 20001
www.oneillinstitute.org
6

require independent medical review (IMR) of specific health plan coverage denials. The health
plan refused to cover the treating physician’s non-standard treatment recommendation because it
was not medically necessary. Relying on Illinois state law, Moran requested an independent
medical review of her claim, which the insurer rejected. Over a vigorous dissent, the majority
ruled that the Illinois law did not impose a new obligation or remedy, but instead resembled a
second opinion. Therefore, IMR was saved from preemption as a legitimate state-based
insurance regulation that will cause only minimal administrative burdens. To the dissent, a statemandated IMR should have been preempted because it altered the remedies available under
ERISA’s exclusive remedial scheme and hence interfered with the national administration of
EBPs.
In 2003, the Supreme Court further deferred to state legislation under ERISA’s savings
provision. In Kentucky Association of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 29 the Court upheld
Kentucky’s any willing provider (AWP) law against an ERISA preemption challenge. (AWP
laws prevent a health plan from excluding any medical provider who is willing and able to meet
the terms and conditions of plan participation.) 30 Relying on the Moran case, the Court ruled
that AWP laws were saved from ERISA preemption as being specifically directed toward the
insurance industry, even if they placed limits on other sectors (in this instance, on physicians).
Recognizing that its prior cases failed to provide the lower courts with clear guidance, the Court
redefined a two-part savings clause to determine when a state law will be deemed to regulate
insurance: “First, the state law must be specifically be directed toward entities engaged in
insurance. Second,…the state law must substantially affect the risk pooling arrangement
between the insurer and the insured.” Because the AWP law at issue altered the scope of
bargaining between providers and insurers, the Court held that the law met the risk-pooling
aspect of the two-part test.
Taken together, the Moran and Miller cases potentially provide greater leeway for states to
regulate health insurance arrangements. Along with the direct/indirect analysis in Travelers,
these cases provide the analytical framework for determining whether the current state health
reform initiatives can survive an ERISA preemption challenge.
State Tort Litigation. Another case in 1995, Dukes v. U.S. Healthcare, Inc., 31 opened an even
wider attack on ERISA preemption. The plaintiffs claimed damages in state court under theories
of direct and vicarious liability for injuries arising while being treated at a U.S. Healthcare HMO.
When Dukes was decided, courts had consistently held that challenges to benefit coverage
decisions, including delayed or denied care resulting from cost containment initiatives, were
preempted as involving the interpretation of plan benefits. Dukes established the principle that
challenges to the technical quality of care (i.e., treatment claims against managed-care
organizations for their role in substandard clinical care) do not involve the administration of plan
benefits and will not be preempted, allowing state courts to resolve the litigation.
In 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court attempted to clarify its view of the treatment-coverage
distinction in Pegram v. Herdrich. 32 In this case, Pegram asserted that her insurance plan’s
financial incentives for physicians led her doctor to delay an abdominal ultrasound. During the
delay, her appendix ruptured, resulting in peritonitis. After the lower court held that ERISA
preempted this claim, she reframed the litigation as a breach of fiduciary duty. The Supreme
Court rejected the fiduciary duty claim as well, but left open the possibility that the Court
accepted the treatment-coverage distinction as a basis for avoiding ERISA preemption. But the
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Court’s language was ambiguous as to the kinds of mixed treatment and coverage decisions (i.e.,
those instances raising both coverage and treatment aspects) that should be subject to state law. 33
C. Preemption Redux: 2004-2008
The viability of state tort action against health plans did not last long. In Aetna Health Inc. v.
Davila, 34 the Court clarified that mixed treatment-coverage cases (arguably the most contentious
and numerous issues likely to be challenged), would indeed be preempted, holding that ERISA
preempts a Texas law imposing a duty to exercise ordinary care in handling benefit coverage
decisions. The Davila case makes a swift retreat from the expectation that Pegram supported the
treatment-coverage distinction. Equally important, the Court refused to extend its rulings in the
Miller and Moran cases. Without an extended analysis, the majority opinion rejected the claim
that the Texas law should be saved from preemption as regulating insurance. The Court simply
stated that the Texas law provided a claim for benefits outside of ERISA’s remedial scheme, but
did not disclose its reasoning for why the Texas law differed from the laws considered in Miller
and Moran.
Lower Court Interpretations of Davila, Miller, and Moran. The Davila decision is not the
Supreme Court’s most recent pronouncement on ERISA, but it is an important one for health
reform proposals. 35 Along with the Miller and Moran cases, how the lower courts interpret
Davila will clarify the extent to which state health reform legislation survives an ERISA
preemption challenge.
Citing Davila, lower courts have limited the Miller case in claims for reimbursement under state
insurance laws. Despite the Miller decision upholding AWP laws, courts have read Davila as
curbing the remedies that providers can seek when insurance companies violate these laws. 36 In
decisions interpreting state regulations aimed at expanding health coverage for the uninsured,
courts have interpreted the savings clause test articulated in Miller fairly narrowly and have used
the test to preempt smaller-scale state laws purportedly aimed at the insurance industry.
Similarly, courts have refused to use the Miller test to uphold large-scale state health care reform
initiatives. Lower court cases that have interpreted Rush Prudential and Miller have focused on
the risk-pooling prong of the new test articulated in Miller to preempt laws that do not
substantially affect the transfer of risk. 37 At the same time, courts have upheld state laws where
they satisfy Miller’s risk-pooling test, such as rules resulting in insurers paying for more claims
and incurring larger risks or altering the scope of bargains between insurers and insureds. 38
D. Interpretations of State Health Reform Legislation
The central question on the health policy agenda right now is whether ERISA will preempt state
health reform initiatives. For our purposes, I will focus on what I expect will be the two key
preemption issues to address—“pay-or-play” systems and individual mandates. 39 The leading
example of state-based health reform legislation is the much-discussed Massachusetts plan
enacted in 2006.
The Massachusetts approach combines individual and employer mandates with government
subsidies. By far the most controversial and landmark aspect of the legislation is the
individual mandate, which places responsibility on the individual to obtain health insurance.
If an individual can afford insurance and chooses not to purchase it, he or she can be fined.
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Employers with more than ten employees are required to make a fair and reasonable
contribution to workers’ health insurance coverage or else be subject to a $295 assessment
per employee. The assessment fee is intended as an incentive to offer insurance.
One of the main aspects of the Massachusetts reform is The Connector, which allows groups
to purchase insurance and ensures insurance portability from job to job. The Connector acts
as a facilitator between individuals and small businesses and private insurance plans to
ensure that these plans are of high value and good quality.
To fund the program, the plan redistributes existing funding, including Medicaid payments
for safety net providers and the uncompensated care pool. New funding comes from
employer contributions and general fund revenues. The Commonwealth Care Health
Insurance Plan provides subsidized health insurance for households with income up to 300%
of the federal poverty level.
Pay-or-Play. Somewhat surprisingly, there has been no ERISA challenge to the Massachusetts
law. Since then, other states and municipalities have enacted variations of the Massachusetts law
that have resulted in ERISA preemption litigation. Already, there are three appellate decisions
(discussed below) and several law review commentaries analyzing states’ pay-or-play health
reform initiatives. Two of the three cases ruled that ERISA preempted the legislation, while the
third overturned the lower’s court’s preemption decision. Although the specifics differ across
the states, the essential organizing principle of current state health reform initiatives is that
employers must either spend a certain amount on employee health care or pay a specified fee
(i.e., a tax or assessment) to the state in lieu of providing coverage.
Maryland’s Fair Share Act required employers that employed more than 10,000 workers to spend
at least 8% of their total payroll on employees’ health care or spend at least 8% of total payroll
on employees’ health care costs. Otherwise, employers were required to pay the difference
between their spending and 8% of total payroll to Maryland’s Medicaid fund. The law was soon
referred to as the Wal-Mart law because it only affected one company. In Retail Industry
Leaders Association v. Fielder, 40 the court ruled that ERISA preempted the Act because it
interfered with plan administration. By forcing the employer to restructure its plan to offer a
state-imposed minimum level of health benefits, the statute impermissibly related to ERISA.
Suffolk County, New York, enacted similar legislation which also effectively only applied to
Wal-Mart. Under the Suffolk County law, non-unionized retailers were required to spend the
health cost rate amount on health benefits of each employee for each hour worked regardless of
their full or part-time status. In the alternative, employers could make a lump sum payment to a
community health center equal to the number of hours worked by employees multiplied by the
public health cost rate. In Retail Industry Leaders Association v. Suffolk County, 41 the court
ruled that ERISA preempted the legislation. As in the Maryland case, the court determined that
the legislation did not offer any real choice to employers other than to restructure its benefits
plans. The interference with the administration of an employer-sponsored ERISA plan
impermissibly related to ERISA.
San Francisco enacted an ordinance requiring private employers with 20 or more full time
employees (FTEs) and non-profits with 50 or more FTEs to make minimum health care
expenditures for their employees. The ordinance defines health care expenditures as direct
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contributions to the employee, reimbursement for health services, or payments to the City to be
used on behalf of their covered employees. Under the ordinance, if the employer fails to make
the required expenditure on behalf of its employees, it must make payments directly to the City.
The ordinance is designed to provide access to care for uninsured adults living in San Francisco
who do not qualify for coverage under Medicaid. In contrast to the above two cases, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals in Golden Gate Restaurant Association v. City and County of San
Francisco 42 ruled that ERISA does not preempt the ordinance.
The Ninth Circuit found that the ordinance does not regulate benefits or charges for benefits
provided by ERISA plans, stating that: “First, the Ordinance does not require employers to
establish their own ERISA plans or to make any changes to any existing ERISA plans….Second,
the Ordinance is not concerned with the nature of the health care benefits an employer provides
its employees.” 43 Most importantly, the court also found that the ordinance does not bind
ERISA administrators to a particular choice of rules for determining plan eligibility or
entitlement to particular benefits. Relying on Travelers, the court instead concluded that the
ordinance does not relate to an ERISA plan. 44 With regard to the Fielder case, the Ninth Circuit
argued that the two cases are compatible because Maryland left employers without real options,
writing, “[i]n stark contrast to the Maryland law in Fielder, the City-payment option offers
employers a meaningful alternative that allows them to preserve the existing structure of their
ERISA plans.” 45
What accounts for the different case outcomes? In two major areas, San Francisco’s law is
distinguishable from Maryland’s, which may account for the different judicial opinions. First,
the San Francisco law applies to a range of employers, and it is akin to a law of general
applicability rather than a law directed specifically at an EBP. Second, the options given to
employers under the San Francisco law represent real choices (i.e., tangible benefits to
employees compared to Maryland less practical alternatives) in the marketplace rather than a
forced choice between restructuring ERISA plans or being out of compliance with ERISA. (For
a comparison of the Maryland and San Francisco laws, see Appendix A.)
An important difference between the San Francisco law and the Maryland law is that the San
Francisco law, at least ostensibly, applies to employers with or without ERISA plans, and is able
to function without the existence of such plans. By contrast, the Maryland law was designed to
apply to one employer in the state, Wal-Mart. In its decision preempting the Maryland law, the
Fourth Circuit paid special attention to this fact. Thus, Maryland’s law amounted to a direct
regulation on ERISA plans rather than a revenue statute of general applicability. To avoid
ERISA preemption, laws that are of general applicability to all insurers may escape direct
regulation of or reference to ERISA.
What are the implications for pay-or-play laws? Despite the Ninth Circuit’s statement that its
opinion does not indicate a split in the federal courts, it seems likely that many observers will
reach a different conclusion. If so, the apparent split may hasten Supreme Court review. When
combined with the important public policy implications of pay-or-play laws, there is a good
chance that the Supreme Court will accept the inevitable appeal of the San Francisco law. In the
meantime, lower courts will continue to struggle with the preemption analysis and will likely
reach contradictory results. Until the Supreme Court clarifies whether ERISA preempts pay-orplay laws, state and local health reform efforts will remain in ERISA limbo (otherwise known as
purgatory).
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As with the courts, health law commentators are split on whether pay-or-play laws are likely to
survive an ERISA preemption challenge. While the weight of the commentary suggests that
these laws will be preempted, that assessment is not unanimous. Most of those concluding that
pay-or-play laws will be preempted include such commentators as Edward Zelinsky, Kathlynn
Polvino, Jon Shimabukuro and Jennifer Staman, who largely adopt the Fourth Circuit’s “relate
to” analysis. Amy Monahan largely agrees, but indicates that Massachusetts’s “soft” pay-or-play
law may offer the courts a way of avoiding preemption without burdening plan administration.
In contrast, Pat Butler (along with Catherine Fisk and Michael Oswalt) argues that “ERISA
should not preempt a well-designed pay-or-play law that offers a dollar-for-dollar credit for
employer health care spending because, under the reasoning of the Travelers case, it does not
interfere with ERISA plan administration choices.” 46 This quote captures the essence of what is
likely to be the crux of the argument: if the Supreme Court follows the Travelers line of cases,
pay-or-play laws could survive. But if the Court reverts to the mean of preemption, as I expect,
the laws will be preempted.
Individual Mandates. Unlike pay-or-play, the issue of whether ERISA might preempt laws that
would mandate individuals to purchase health insurance (similar to mandatory automobile
insurance coverage) has received considerably less attention. As far I can tell, the issue has not
yet been litigated. Zelinsky has published an extensive analysis of the issue, concluding that the
Massachusetts law (currently the most comprehensive individual health insurance mandate) “is
the kind of mandated benefit structure that remains ERISA preempted under Travelers.” 47
Zelinsky argues that the individual mandate is not part of a general insurance regulatory scheme
that effectively imposes a floor on what benefits plan administrators will be able to offer in
Massachusetts. Thus, individual mandates bind plan administrators. Zelinsky argues that the
statute dictates plan choices, and dismisses the argument that the Travelers line of cases saves
the regulation from preemption because individual mandates only have an indirect effect on
EBPs. 48 Zelinsky notes that Fielder rejected a similar analysis in the Maryland pay-or-play
decision (though not specifically referring to an individual mandate).
Without belaboring the point, I disagree with Zelinsky’s analysis on two grounds. First, the
mandate goes to individuals, not to any EBP. Indeed, Butler goes further to argue that an
individual mandate does not constitute insurance regulation under the savings clause because it is
directed to individuals, not insurers, under the Miller test discussed earlier. 49 If there is a burden,
it falls on the individual to meet the expected benefits floor or the employer to keep track of
expenditures made to meet the employer’s obligation. Nothing in the law requires an
administrator to adjust its benefit package. Under the Ninth Circuit’s analysis in Golden Gate
Restaurant Association, the individual mandate would not constitute an EBP because the city
establishes and maintains the mandate. Since the EBP is not required to establish or administer
insurance benefits under the mandate, the ordinance does not establish or maintain an ERISA
plan. 50 Second, under Travelers, as Monahan observes, the individual mandate has such a
tangential relationship to an EBP that an ERISA preemption challenge would be unlikely to
succeed. 51 At best, the administrative burden is likely to be minimal.
In this context, it is worth noting (at least for analytical, if not necessarily legal, import) that the
first prong of DOL’s safe harbor for determining when a health plan does not constitute an
ERISA plan is that no contributions are made by an employer or employee organization. 52 In
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any event, individual mandates appear to be insurance regulations of general applicability—to all
persons residing in the state—that should be saved from ERISA preemption as legitimate state
regulation of insurance. An individual mandate may or may not be desirable health policy, but if
enacted, the mandate should survive an ERISA preemption challenge.
Summary. At this point, it is anybody’s guess how the Supreme Court might rule on whether
ERISA preempts pay-or-play systems or how the lower courts would examine ERISA
preemption challenges to individual mandates. Small scale reforms will likely survive because
they are unlikely to burden EBPs, but will hardly address the real problems facing the health care
system. Unfortunately, the kinds of large scale reforms that are desperately needed are likely to
be preempted because, almost by definition, they must bind administrators to be successful.
Accordingly, I anticipate that pay-or-play systems will not survive an ERISA preemption
challenge, while individual mandates will not be preempted. In short, the courts are unlikely to
absolve Congress from amending ERISA to permit state health reform experiments to proceed
on a sufficient scale.
III. Potential Solutions
Before considering potential solutions, I should add a few words about ERISA in the context of
federalism and separation of powers. 53 ERISA is a window through which health policy over
the past 20 years or so can be observed. As a philosophical matter, recent Supreme Court
doctrine, particularly in ERISA preemption cases, is based on the doctrine of separation of
powers. One of the principal interpretive tenets or norms repeatedly stated by the current
Supreme Court is that social policy should be made by the elected representatives, not by the
courts. The opinions considered above consistently observe that if ERISA preemption is to
change, it is Congress’s responsibility, not the Supreme Court’s, to do so. In strongly deferring
to Congress, the Court has sent an unmistakable signal that it does not view its mandate as
alleviating market or legislative deficiencies.
An important corollary doctrine about the structure of government is federalism—the question of
whether power resides with the states or with the federal government. This debate goes back to
the earliest days of the republic, with the federalists, led by Alexander Hamilton, arguing for a
strong central government, while the Jeffersonians argued for greater state sovereignty. From
the New Deal through the early 1980s, Supreme Court rulings generally favored the federal
government and expanded the reach of federal legislation. Since then, that approach has been
reversed, with the Court generally deferring to the states and constricting Congress’s legislative
authority under the Commerce Clause. 54
A. Congressional Action
During the mid to late 1990s, one of the most contentious health policy debates was over
patients’ rights, and whether to amend ERISA to permit state-based tort litigation against MCOs.
Since 2001 this issue has faded into the background. If the historical trends described earlier are
accurate, attempts to amend ERISA are likely to reemerge as a salient health policy issue. Only
this time, the primary focus will be on amending ERISA to permit broader state health reform
initiatives, with patients’ rights as a secondary consideration.
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In theory, amending ERISA preemption would be the easiest way to provide states with needed
flexibility to enact health reform proposals. In practice, there is still likely to be considerable
congressional opposition to any weakening of ERISA preemption. But with a new
administration and, more importantly, with large employers perhaps more desperate to ease their
health insurance costs, congressional action may be possible.
One consideration is whether Congress could amend ERISA in a way to permit state reforms
without opening EBPs to excessive regulatory scrutiny generally. That is, the attempt to allow
states greater freedom to pursue a variety of health reform experiments may have the unintended
consequence of allowing more expansive state legislative oversight of EBPs. At a minimum,
Congress could consider enacting ERISA waivers to permit state health reform experiments to
proceed without worrying about a disruptive ERISA preemption challenge. 55
B. Regulatory Action
Absent amending ERISA, the Obama administration could devise regulatory strategies to
mitigate some aspects of ERISA preemption and to facilitate state health reform initiatives. One
alternative suggested in Davila’s concurring opinion leaves considerable room for a regulatory
response:
The Government notes a potential amelioration. Recognizing that "this Court has
construed Section 502(a)(3) not to authorize an award of money damages against
a non-fiduciary," the Government suggests that the Act, as currently written and
interpreted, may "allow at least some forms of 'make-whole' relief against a
breaching fiduciary in light of the general availability of such relief in equity at
the time of the divided bench."…[T]he Government's suggestion may indicate an
effective remedy others similarly circumstanced might fruitfully pursue.
As noted, most of the DOL’s regulatory actions have been on the pension side, and it has not
acted to fill the vacuum on the health care benefits issues. Unlike antitrust, where the judicial
and regulatory branches interact—sometimes uneasily—to form antitrust policy, the courts have
acted exclusively to shape ERISA preemption doctrine. But DOL could issue regulations that
would simultaneously protect patients and plans. Taking an aggressive approach, DOL could
define two of the key ERISA terms that courts or legislation has not defined—“plan” and
“benefit”—to alleviate the rigidity of ERISA preemption. Is benefit the payment of money, the
goods, services the insurance purchases (i.e., medical care) or membership in an MCO? 56 A
major flaw in ERISA preemption is the limited damages available if a case is removed to federal
court (i.e., patients can only recover the amount of the benefit). To correct that deficiency, DOL
might define benefit to include reasonable economic and noneconomic damages. For instance,
DOL could develop a schedule of damages to include the cost of making the patient whole, along
with lost wages and pain and suffering.
Similarly, several observers have noted that ERISA does not define a health plan, 57 and the
courts have only said that a plan is not the equivalent of the benefits themselves. 58 For reasons
that are not obvious, courts have ruled that MCOs are included in the definition of plan, but not
physicians. The result has been to preempt MCOs from state tort liability while leaving
physicians exposed to full liability when they may not actually control resource allocation
decisions. 59 Because the statutory definition of plan is somewhat tautological, 60 nothing
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prevents DOL from issuing a regulation that clarifies the meaning of these two terms and
establishes that ERISA was not intended to “govern the relationships between employees and
third parties, such as MCOs.” 61
In terms of the current state health reform legislation, DOL could issue a regulation that sets the
contours of how far states could proceed before implicating ERISA preemption. The mechanism
for this would be through an interpretation of the savings clause. For example, DOL could adopt
the direct/indirect analysis in the Travelers case and provide potential scenarios where a law
would be within the scope of the savings clause. Other governmental agencies, particularly the
Department of Justice/Federal Trade Commission’s health antitrust guidelines, have used a
similar strategy. Likewise, the key judicial consideration in the state reform legislation enacted
so far is the dispute over what constitutes other legitimate compliance options in a pay-or-play
system. It would be an appropriate regulatory interpretation for DOL to outline valid state
options that would be saved from preemption.
Beyond the substantive regulations DOL might consider, the agency could adopt procedural
regulations that would facilitate the implementation of health reform initiatives. For instance,
DOL could place the burden of justifying regulations of EBPs on the states. DOL could outline
what it considers to be the appropriate balance between flexible state health reforms and
excessive regulation of EBPs. As long as states operate within the safe harbor, DOL would
support the reform. If states go beyond the safe harbor, states could seek a waiver from DOL to
continue the experiment.
As to whether courts would uphold these regulations, as a matter of the separation of powers, it
would certainly be preferable for Congress to define these terms. Absent that, it would be an
appropriate exercise of regulatory discretion to address terms that neither the Court nor Congress
has defined. The health insurance industry would undoubtedly contest any regulations that
weakened the current force of ERISA preemption. Since these regulations complement rather
than undermine ERISA preemption, courts should defer to DOL’s expertise. Whether these or
similar regulations would result in dramatically different legal doctrine remains to be seen. For
instance, courts might balk at any expanded remedy as violating ERISA’s exclusive remedial
structure. In any event, it will be difficult for regulators to overcome 25 years of judicial
doctrine. Suffice it to say that new regulations might provide state legislators with a more level
playing field. In particular, new regulations would impose some needed regulatory oversight of
plan administrators, along with the accountability that is presently lacking.
Conclusion
Regardless of what the options were at the outset of judicial consideration of ERISA preemption,
the broad initial preemption rulings set the tone and scope of ERISA doctrine that continues to
this day. Yet if the analysis in this paper is correct, there is a certain consistency that emerges
over time—the return to preemption as the default option. If that trend holds, state-based health
reform initiatives could be blocked if challenged.
It is entirely possible that my analysis imposes more of a narrative arc to ERISA interpretation
and litigation than it deserves. 62 Other commentators may well argue that there are too many
exceptions to justify a “regression to the mean” trajectory. Admittedly, I have not undertaken an
adequate empirical analysis to determine whether the analytical frame I have sketched would fit
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the data. As the split among commentators noted throughout suggests, interpreting ERISA
litigation trends is highly subjective. There is little clarity as to how ERISA will be interpreted
in future cases, and little agreement among commentators as to why ERISA should be
interpreted one way or the other.
Part of this uncertainty resides in a statute that is poorly and ambiguously drafted, and largely
applicable to pension plans rather than the way health care is now organized and delivered.
Congress has refused to amend ERISA, and the Department of Labor has generally refused to
regulate it. The time has come for a new approach—one that facilitates reform instead of
impeding it.
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APPENDIX A
Comparison of the Maryland and San Francisco “Pay or Play” Laws
Maryland (Wal-Mart) Law
San Francisco Law
What are the Covered employers are required to spend at Covered employers are required to
make minimum “health care
least 8% of their payroll on “health
main
expenditures” ranging from $1.17 to
insurance costs.” If the employer fails to
provisions?
spend the required amount, the law requires $1.76 per employee per hour
depending on the number of full-time
the employer to pay the difference between
what the employer spent on health insurance employees. An employer has several
options for meeting its “health care
costs and the 8% requirement into the
expenditure” requirement. In addition
Maryland Fair Share Health Care Fund.
to contributing in some way to
The Fund was to help finance Maryland’s
payment for health care services or
Medicaid program.
insurance, the employer has the option
of paying its required expenditure to
the city. Amounts paid to the city will
fund the Health Access Program,
which aims to provide medical care to
the uninsured population of San
Francisco.
Provide access to care for uninsured
Maryland was attempting to address the
What is the
adults living in the city of San
rising cost of Medicaid and the high
law’s
Francisco who do not qualify for
proportion of uninsured people in the state.
purpose?
coverage under Medicaid.
Legislative history indicates that legislators
understood the Act as requiring Wal-Mart
(the only company to which the act applied)
to increase its healthcare spending. The
statute was specifically designed only to
apply to Wal-Mart.
Under the Employer Spending
Employers with more than 10,000
What
Requirement, for-profit employers with
employees (NOTE: only four employers in
employers
more than 20 employees and non-profit
are covered? the state met this number - Johns Hopkins
employers with more than 50
University, Northrop Grumman, Giant
employees.
Food, and Wal-Mart. However, the law
only applied to Wal-Mart because Johns
Hopkins met the lesser requirement for nonprofits and Northrop Grumman and Giant
Food spent enough on health care to be
exempt).
For-profit employers were required to either Covered employers must contribute
Amount of
$1.17 to $1.76 per hour per employee
1.) spend at least 8% of their payroll on
employer
toward “health care expenditures.”
contribution? health benefits or 2.) pay the difference
directly into the state’s newly created public
health care fund to defray Medicaid costs.
Covered non-profit employers were required
to spend 6% of their payroll on health
benefits.
Health care expenditure” is defined as
What options “Health insurance costs” defined as any
any amount paid by a covered
do employers amount paid by an employer to provide
health care or health insurance to employees employer to its employees or a third
have under
to the extent costs may be deductible under
party on behalf of its employees for the
the law?
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federal tax law. Expenditures that could
qualify as “health insurance costs” included:
- Maintenance of on-site medical
clinics.
- Contribution to employees’ Health
Savings Accounts.
- Payment for medical care,
prescription drugs, or vision care.
- Restructure of employee benefits
plans to increase amount paid
toward insurance.
- “Any other costs to provide health
benefits.”

Are there
reporting
requirements
under the
law?

An employer also had the option of paying
the difference of what the employer
contributed in health care expenditures and
the 8% requirement into the Maryland Fair
Share Fund.
Yes. Covered employer must make annual
reports providing the amount spent by the
employer on health insurance costs in the
state, and the percentage of payroll that was
spent by the employer on health insurance
costs in the state.

purpose of providing health care
services. Health care expenditures
include:
- Employer-provided insurance.
- Contribution to employees’
health savings accounts.
- Direct payment of medical
bills to employees.
- Payment to a third party for
employees’ medical care.
An employer also has the option of
paying towards the new city program,
Healthy San Francisco.

Yes. Covered employers must report
on their health care expenditures on an
annual basis using the “Mandatory
Annual Reporting Form” provided to
all registered businesses in San
Francisco.
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